Group oriented applications are getting more and more popular in today's mobile Internet and call for secure and efficient (t,n) threshold secret sharing scheme (or (t,n)-SS) to meet their requirements. A (t,n)-SS divides a secret into n shares such that any t or more than t shares can recover the secret while less than t shares cannot. However, an adversary, even without a valid share, may obtain the secret by mounting Illegal Participant (IP) attack or Half Threshold Channel Cracking (HTCC) attack. Therefore, 1) the paper presents the notion and generic framework of (t,m,n)-Tightly Coupled Secret Sharing ((t,m,n)-TCSS). Prior to recovering the secret, it requires m (m ≥ t) participants to form a tightly coupled group by each independently constructing a component with the share. All m components have to be used to recover the secret and thus both attacks can be thwarted more directly and simply. Furthermore, following the framework, threshold changeable secret sharing can also be easily constructed. 2) As an implementation of the framework, a linear code based (t,m,n)-TCSS scheme is proposed. Analyses show that the scheme can prevent IP, HTCC and (t − 1)-Insider conspiring attacks with asymptotically perfect security. Moreover, it doesn't depend on any computational assumption and is more secure and efficient in storage, communication and computation when compared with related schemes. 3) Based on (t,m,n)-TCSS, a group authentication scheme is constructed, which allows a group user to authenticate whether all users are legal group members at once and thus provides efficient and flexible m-to-m authentication for group oriented applications.
Group Authentication
1. Introduction
Traditional (t,n)-threshold secret sharing and its applications
With the development of mobile Internet, network applications don't limit to 1-to-1 or 1-to-m (i.e., client/server) interaction pattern any more. Group oriented applications with m-to-m interaction pattern are getting more and more popular especially in mobile social apps. Group chat is one of group oriented applications provided by most social apps, and it is actually an online meeting system and allows a user to invite his/her friends to have a meeting anytime and anywhere. For example, WeChat, the most popular mobile social app with over 600 million users in Asia, enables a user to initiate a group for an ad hoc session on demand. In the group, any user is allowed to send/receive messages, start an audio/video chat or invite his/her friends into the group. Consequently, a user may not be familiar with some other users. However, a main concern about the online meeting is authentication. That is, each user needs to make sure that any other user in the group has the right identity, especially when the meeting is confidential. That is because any user at a confidential meeting is responsible for the information he/she releases, and never wants any wrong person to have access to it. In this case, each user needs to authenticate all the others successfully, or else the meeting must be aborted.
Traditionally, one user employs a 1-to-1 authentication scheme to verify another user's identity. In such a scheme, one user (verifier) gets convinced that the other user (prover) is the right one it claims to be. If the 1-to-1 scheme is trivially applied to mutual authentication within a group of m users, there are totally m(m − 1) rounds of authentication. Nevertheless, m rounds are sufficient for the same case if m-to-m authentication scheme is employed, because the new authentication allows each user to verify whether all users are legal group members at once. Therefore, it is of great importance to find a proper cryptographic tool in designing secure and efficient m-to-m authentication schemes for group oriented applications.
As a group oriented cryptographic primitive, (t,n)-threshold secret sharing scheme (or (t,n)-SS) divides a secret into n shares and allocates each share to a shareholder, such that at least t shareholders (i.e., participants) are qualified to recover the secret but less than t are not. In a group of exact t shareholders, each shareholder can verify whether all t shareholders are legal at once if they mutually exchange shares, independently reconstruct the secret and check the correctness. Therefore, (t,n)-SSs have potential in building m-to-m authentication schemes.
Since (t,n)-SS was first introduced separately by Shamir [1] and Blakley [22] in 1979, it has been studied extensively in the literature [23] [21] [24] [26] [25] and widely used in many applications, such as secure multiparty computation [27] , threshold signature [28] , group key agreement [29] , group authentication [20] etc. al. As the most popular (t,n)-SS, Shamir's scheme [1] is constructed based on a polynomial of degree at most (t−1) in a finite field. Blakley's scheme [22] is based on hyperplane while Asmuth-Bloom's scheme [23] and Mignotte's scheme [21] are both based on Chinese Remainder Theorem. Linear code is another tool to construct (t,n)-SSs. In 1981, McEliece and Sarwate [24] proposed a formulation of (t,n) threshold secret sharing scheme based on maximum-distance-separable (MDS) codes, and pointed out that Shamir's (t,n) threshold scheme can be constructed equivalently by using Reed-Solomon code. Subsequently, many secret sharing schemes based on linear codes were proposed [26] [19] [18] . In [26] [19] , Massey utilized the linear code to construct a secret sharing scheme, meanwhile he also presented the relationship between the access structure of secret sharing and the minimal code word of the dual code in linear code. All the above (t,n)-SSs do not depend on any computational assumption of hard problem or one way function.
In general, a (t,n)-SS scheme consists of share generation and secret reconstruction. In share generation, the dealer generates n shares from the secret to be shared and allocates each shareholder a share securely. In secret reconstruction, t or more than t shareholders (also called participants or players) exchange shares privately and thus each participant can recover the secret from collected shares.
Two attacks against traditional (t,n)-SSs during secret reconstruction
Actually, these above traditional (t,n)-SSs are not secure in practice. In the following, we consider 2 attacks against secret reconstruction with more than t participants, 1) Illegal Participant (or IP) attack and 2) Half Threshold private Channel Cracking (or HTCC) attack.
Both IP and HTCC attacks enable an adversary to obtain the secret without having any valid share.
1) IP attack
Suppose there are m, (m ≥ t + 1), participants in secret reconstruction, and one of them is an adversary without any valid share. If participants are not required to release their shares simultaneously and the adversary, in the name of some legal shareholder, (e.g. Shareholder 2 in Fig.1 ) may communicate with the others, it could wait to collect enough (i.e.,m − 1 ≥ t) valid shares from the other participants and thus recover the secret. With these shares, the adversary can also forge a valid share and then act as a legal participant without being detected. We call it Illegal Participant (IP) Attack. One countermeasure against the IP attack is user authentication [17] [16] . It guarantees that only right shareholders are allowed to participate in secret reconstruction, but user authentication makes (t,n)-SS more complicated because each participant needs to be authenticated by the others. Moreover, whether a secret can be recovered should depend on the share a participant holds rather than his/her identity.
2) HTCC attack
In traditional (t,n)-SSs, there usually exists a private channel between each pair of participants, by which 2 participants exchange shares privately. Once an adversary cracks a private channel, it can intercept any information through the channel, including 2 shares of the involved participants. Consequently, an adversary may recover the secret if it manages to crack t/2 distinct private channels, even though the number of participant m may be much larger than the threshold t. We called it Half Threshold private Channel Cracking (or HTCC) attack.
Similarly, if each participant, say A, sends its share to participant B via a private channel while receives share from B via another private channel, an adversary may recover the secret if it manages to crack t distinct private channels.
That is, the robustness of (t, n)-SS against private channel cracking attack depends on t rather than m. Obviously, it is more desirable if the robustness depends on the number of participant m instead of t due to m ≥ t.
Note that, for the convenience of discussion, the paper just takes the former case (i.e., HTCC attack) as example since the latter case is highly similar to the former. Remark 1.1. Although adversaries in IP and HTCC attacks both have no valid share and need to collect enough shares by mounting attack before obtaining the secret, they are different in substance. An IP adversary may actively participate in secret reconstruction while a HTCC adversary merely eavesdrops cracked private channels passively and stays out of secret reconstruction. In other words, the information (i.e.,fake share) of the adverary in IP attack is used by all the other participants in secret reconstruction and thus leads to error, while all information used by participants is correct in HTCC attack. This results in the fact that a countmeasure valid for one attack is not always valid for the other. For example, user authentication [17] [16] can prevent IP attack but cannot thwart HTCC attack; In contrast, Harn's secure secret reconstruction [13] is resistant to HTCC attack but fails to prevent IP attack in most cases. 
Related Work
As far as we know, there are the following 3 related countermeasures against IP or HTCC attack in secret sharing.
1) Shuffling Schemes
Currently, complete shuffling [15] and partial shuffling [14] schemes are available to cope with HTCC as well as IP attack in (t,n)-SS.
Incomplete shuffling [15] with m participants, every pair of participants exchange a shuffling factor (i.e. random integer), and thus each finally gets (m − 1) shuffling factors in total. A participant constructs a shuffled partial share with the (m − 1) shuffling factors. All m shuffled partial shares are required to recover the secret; and thus a complete shuffling based (t,n)-SS forces an adversary to crack at least m/2 distinct private channels before figuring out the secret. There are totally m(m − 1)/2 shuffling factors exchanged in the scheme, which is obviously inefficient in communication for large m. Subsequently, Zhang proposed the partial shuffling scheme [14] , m participants form a loop in some order and communicate along the loop, each of them just picks one random number as the shuffling factor such that the sum of all shuffling factors is zero. Consequently, m participants need to exchange m shuffling factors in total, and an adversary has to crack at least t private channel before obtaining the secret. However, both schemes require extra communication to exchange shuffling factor before secret reconstruction.
2) Threshold Changeable Secret Sharing (t, n)−threshold changeable secret sharing scheme (threshold changeable SS) allows shareholders to change threshold from t to t > t. In this case, t or more than t shareholders can recover the secret while less than t cannot. Therefore, some (t, n)−threshold changeable SSs can prevent IP and HTCC attacks if there are exact t participants with t ≤ t ≤ n and the threshold is also raised to t . For example,the dealer in schemes [12] [11], generate multiple shares for every shareholder, each share with a distinct threshold t > t. Therefore, if shares with t threshold are used to reconstruct the secret, exact t participants can prevent IP and HTCC attacks. However, every shareholder in such schemes has to hold multiple shares and thus requires more storage, moreover, these schemes only raise threshold to predefined values.
As an improvement, Ron Steinfeld et al presented a lattice-based threshold changeable SS [10] , shareholders add some noise to their shares or delete some bits of their share to compute subshares, which contain partial information about the original shares. As a result, a larger number t > t of subshares are required to recover the secret by using a "error-correction" combiner algorithm. The scheme does not require communication either be-tween the dealer and shareholders or among shareholders. However, 1) the share combiner needs to communicate with all participants and instruct them to change threshold; 2) the scheme is lattice-based and thus is complicated in computation; 3) it is far from a perfect scheme. In 2017, H. Pilaram and T. Eghlidos proposed a lattice based threshold changeable multi-secret sharing scheme [9] .
Nojoumian et al [8] presented a Shamir's (t,n)-SS based dealer-free threshold changeable scheme using secure multiparty computation. The scheme remains some properties of Shamir's (t,n)-SS, such as being unconditionally secure and ideal, moreover, it can change the threshold to any value. Later on, they also proposed a method of increasing threshold by zero addition [7] , it increases the threshold by generating shares of a polynomial that corresponds to a secret with value zero and threshold t > t, and adding these new shares to player's current shares. However, due to resharing operation, both schemes require too much computation in participants and communication among participants. In 2016, Yuan et al [6] came up with 2 threshold changeable schemes based on Lagrange interpolation polynomial and 2-variable oneway function. Both schemes require the dealer to evaluate and store a lot of values before increasing the threshold. Moreover, it needs the combiner (i.e., the proxy of the dealer) to send each participant a distinct key to active the share additionally.
In conclusion, current threshold changeable SSs suffer from either large storage or heavy computation/communication. In section 4, we will propose a special SS scheme which is capable of thwarting IP and HTCC attacks and efficient in storage, computation and communication.
3) Secure Secret Reconstruction Recently, Harn [13] introduced a notion of secure secret reconstruction and proposed the (t,n)-secure secret reconstruction (or SSR) scheme. The scheme takes advantage of the homomorphism of polynomials [3] and does not call for extra communication before recovering the secret. It claims that the secret can only be reconstructed if each participant has valid shares, and thus can defeat IP and HTCC attacks without using user authentication. Actually it is not true. Based on similar idea, Harn et al [5] also proposed a bivariate SS scheme, which has the similar problem. We will discuss it in section 3.
Therefore, it is necessary to construct an efficient secret sharing scheme against both IP and HTCC attacks simultaneously to meet the security requirement of aforementioned group oriented applications.
Contributions
We summarize the contributions in 3 aspects. 1) In order to cope with IP and HTCC attacks against (t,n)-SS, the paper presents the notion and generic framework of (t,m,n)-Tightly Coupled Secret Sharing (or (t,m,n)-TCSS). By following the framework, most traditional (t,n)-SSs can be simply converted into (t,m,n)-TCSSs and thus endowed with the capability to frustrate both attacks. It should be noted that (t,m,n)-TCSS under the framework can be applied to any scenario of (t,n)-SS. Moreover, threshold changeable secret sharing schemes can also be easily constructed according to the framework.
2) As an implementation of the framework, a concrete (t,m,n)-TCSS scheme is proposed from the traditional linear code based (t,n)-SS. The (t,m,n)-TCSS does not depend on any hard problem or one-way function. In contrast with related schemes, the (t,m,n)-TCSS is resistant to the above 2 attacks without special limitations and more efficient in storage, computation and communication.
3) As an application of the (t,m,n)-TCSS scheme, a group authentication protocol is constructed to enable the rapid m-to-m authentication in group oriented applications. The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In next section, we briefly review the linear code based (t,n)-SS and Harn's Secure Secret Reconstruction; section 3 gives the definition of Tightly Coupled Secret Sharing. We describe our proposed (t,m,n)-TCSS and analyze the security in section 4 and section 5 respectively, section 6 summarizes the properties of (t,m,n)-TCSS. As an application, the group authentication protocol is constructed in section 7. Finally, we present some discussions and conclude the paper in section 8 and section 9 respectively.
Preliminaries

Notations and terms
1) Notations
Here are some notations used throughout the paper, I n denotes the integer set {1, 2, ..., n} and is used to lable all n shareholders; I m , with the cardinality |I m | = m, (t ≤m≤ n) is a subset of I n , I m is used to lable any m out of n shareholders; F p = {0, 1, 2, ..., p − 1} is a finite field for large prime p, F * p = {1, 2, ..., p − 1} is the multiplicative group of F p ; r∈ U F p denotes that r is a random number uniformly distributed in F p . |S| is the cardinality of set S.
In (t,n)-SS, a shareholder is also called participant when it is participating in secret recovering. So shareholder and participant will be used alternately during secret reconstruction.
2) Information theoretical terms
Now we introduce some basic terms in information theory, suppose X, Y are discrete-time discrete-valued random variables with sample space SP 1 , SP 2 . The entropy of X is denoted as
where E is the expectation operator and P (X) is the probability distribution function of X. From the view of an adversary, the secret s in (t,n)-SS is indistinguishable from a random variable uniformly distributed in secret space. Therefore, we use H(s) to denote uncertainty of the secret.
The mutual information of X with Y is written as
I(X; Y ) means the amount of information about X obtained due to the knowledge Y . In the following sections, we will write log 2 P (x) as log P (x) for simplicity.
3) Some Definitions Definition 2.1. (Perfect (t,n)-SS) Let s, S and Ω be the secret, secret space and the share set of a (t,n)-SS respectively with |Ω| = n. The (t,n)-SS is perfect with respect to probability distribution of s on the secret space
where Ω J denotes any subset of Ω with less than t shares, i.e. Ω J ⊆ Ω and |Ω J | < t.
As a secret value, the secret s actually appears as a random variable uniformly distributed in secret space S. In a perfect (t,n)-SS, less than t shareholders get no information about the secret even if they have up to t − 1 shares. Loosening the perfect (t,n)-SS a little bit, we get the definition of asymptotically perfect (t,n)-SS as follows.
Definition 2.2. (Asymptotically Perfect (t,n)-SS) A (t,n)-SS is asymptotically perfect with respect to probability distribution of s on secret space S if, for all Ω J with |Ω J | < t, we have 1) H(s) ≥ 0 2) lim |S|→∞ I(s; Ω J ) = 0 where |S| is the cardinality of S. Asymptotically perfect (t, n)-SS implies that less than t shareholders get nearly no information about the secret when the secret space converges to infinity.
Traditional (t,n)-SS based on Linear Code
There are several ways to construct a (t,n)-SS scheme based on linear code [26] , one of them comes as follows:
Assume that a [n + 1, t] linear code LC is a subspace of F n+1 p with length n + 1 and dimension t, and G = ( g 0 , g 1 , ... g n ) is the public generator matrix of linear code LC, where
In the traditional (t,n)-SS scheme based on LC, there is a dealer and n shareholders U 1 , U 2 , ..., U n , the secret s is a value in F p . The scheme consists of the following two steps: Share Generation: The dealer privately chooses a row vector v = (v 0 , v 1 , ..., v t−1 ) ∈ F t p , such that the secret is s = v g 0 mod p, it is obvious that there are totally p t−1 such v for a given pair (s, g 0 ). The dealer generates the code word w = (s 0 , s 1 , ..., s n ) = vG mod p and allocates s i = v g i mod p to U i as the share securely, i = 1, 2, ..., n.
.., U im } need to recover the secret s, they first find a group of param-
holds, and then pool their shares {s i 1 , s i 2 , ..., s im } in private to compute the secret as
Harn's Secure Secret Reconstruction
In 2014, Harn [13] proposed a (t,n) secure secret reconstruction (or SSR) scheme. The scheme claims to be resistant to IP attack without VSS or user authentication. Our work is partly inspired by the notion of this scheme. It works as follows.
1) Share generation
Suppose there are n shareholders, U = {U 1 , U 2 , ..., U n }, the dealer D selects k random polynomials f l (x), l = 1, 2, .., k, over F p with degree no more than t − 1 each and generates k shares f l (x), l = 1, 2, .., k, for each shareholder U r , (U r ∈ U). For any secret s, the dealer can always find integers,
, where w i = w j and w i , w j / ∈ {x 1 , x 2 , ..., x n } for every pair of i and j, x i is the public information of U i (U i ∈ U). The dealer makes these integers w l , d l , l = 1, 2, .., k, publicly known.
2) Secret reconstruction
Assume m, (t ≤m≤ n) out of n shareholders want to recover the secret, each participant Remark 2.1. The scheme claims to require kt > n − 1 to guarantee the security, otherwise, an adversary may collect kt Lagrange components, construct the k polynomials and finally recover the secret. As a matter of fact, m Lagrange components is linearly dependent in the case of k + t − 1 < m < kt. Interested readers can refer to [4] for more detail. Therefore, it is possible for an adversary to forge a valid Lagrange component from the other m − 1 ones and finally obtain the secret without being detected. That is, the scheme is vulnerable to IP attack.
Definition of (t,m,n)-Tightly Coupled Secret Sharing
This section first presents the basic idea and overview of (t,m,n)-Tightly Coupled Secret Sharing (or (t,m,n)-TCSS), then puts forward the notion of (t,m,n)-TCSS, defines the framework and finally presents the property of the new type of SS.
Basic Idea and Overview of (t,m,n)-TCSS
Currently, most related work cannot effectively and efficiently deal with IP and HTCC attacks. In order to simultaneously defeat both attacks during secret reconstruction in traditional (t, n)-SS, we define a new type of SS, (t, m, n)-Tightly Coupled Secret Sharing. On one hand, it is more secure (t, n)-SS and can be applied to any scenario of (t, n)-SS; On the other hand, it provides a suitable cryptographic primitive for group oriented applications.
As we know, for traditional (t, n)-SSs, the reason why IP and HTCC attacks work lies in the direct exchange of bare shares among participants (i.e.,shareholders) during secret reconstruction. In other words, since shares are sent from one participant to another through private channel, an illegal participant are able to directly collect shares from the others, or an adversary can directly intercept shares as long as it cracks the private channel. Consequently, the secret may be obtained illegally if enough shares are collected in the above 2 ways.
After learning the aforementioned reason, we need to present a new type of secret sharing which does not requires bare shares to be transmitted among participants during secret reconstruction. That is, to secure secret reconstruction, the following 2 requirements need to be satisfied at the same time. 1) Shares need to be protected before transmission through private channels, such that an illegal participant cannot figure out the share itself even if it obtains the protected share. By this property, IP attack can be prevented. 2) All participants' protected shares need to be directly used to recover the secret (i.e., need not to uncover any share from the protected one), such that an adversary has to intercept all protected shares before obtaining the secret. By this property, HTCC attack can be thwarted accordingly.
In summary, we need to find a solution based on traditional (t, n)-SSs to protect share during share exchange among participants and guarantee that each protected share has to be directly used to recover the secret.
From the 2 requirements, we can determine the 3 steps of (t, m, n)-TCSS, 1) share generation, which is basically the same as traditional (t,n)-SS and responsible for generating and distributing a share to each shareholder securely. 2) component construction, in which each participant constructs a protected share, called Component, from its own share and all participants' public information non-interactively. 3) secret reconstruction, in which all participants exchange their components, each participant recovers the secret independently from all components.
Following the basic idea, we can easily formulate the definition and framework of (t,m,n)-TCSS, which is capable of thwarting both IP and HTCC attacks and thus enables group oriented application.
Definition and Framework
Definition 3.1. (t,m,n)-Tightly coupled secret sharing Informally, let t, m, n be positive integers with t ≤m≤ n. (t,m,n)-Tightly coupled secret sharing (or (t,m,n)-TCSS ) is a special type of (t,n)-SS and satisfies 1) any t or more than t shareholders are able to recover the secret; 2) less than t shareholders cannot reconstruct the secret and 3) when m shareholders recover the secret, they form a tightly coupled group such that the secret can be recovered only if each participant in the group has a valid share.
A (t,m,n)-TCSS consists of 3 algorithms, Share Generation SG(s, U),
SG(s, U)-it takes the secret s and the set of n shareholders, U, as input and generates Ω, the set of n shares as output. In this algorithm, the dealer generates n shares from the secret s and allocates each share to the corresponding shareholder in U securely.
CC(U m , Ω m , R m )-it takes U m , Ω m as well as R m as input and outputs C m , where U m is the set of participants, denoting a subset of U with m shareholders, Ω m is the share set of U m , R m is a set of m random numbers and C m is the set of m components. In this algorithm, each participant in U m generates a component with its share in Ω m and a random number in R m non-interactively. SR(C m )-it takes C m as input and recovers the secret s as output. In this algorithm, each participant uses all m components of U m (i.e., C m ) to recover the secret independently.
Formal Description and Property
Formally, let S be the secret space, S H share space and I D identity space respectively in (t,n)-SS, s ∈ S is the secret. Assume U = {U i |U i ∈ I D , i = 1, 2, ..., n} are n shareholders, each shareholder U i has the private share s i ∈ S H and public identity U i .
Before any m shareholders, U m , (i.e., U m ⊆ U and |U m | = m), want to recover the secret, they need to form a tightly coupled group by constructing a component each. That is, each shareholder U j ∈ U m constructs a component
s j is the share of U j ; r j is random number uniformly selected from S, i.e., r j ∈ U S, and SU B(I D ) denotes the power set of
where the secret s is viewed as a random variable in S. C is a component set actually used in recovering s, ⇒ 0 denotes converging to 0 if |S| approaches to infinity.
Remark 3.1. The expression (3-1) implies the 2 facts, (1) If C , the component set actually used in secret reconstruction, is identical with C m , the right one generated by U m , and the number of participants is no less than t, the secret is bound to be recovered; (2) If C does not contain all components in C m , almost no information about the secret can be obtained.
serves as 2 functions, one is to hide the share s j from eavesdroppers (i.e., Outsiders in section 4.1) by using r j as perturbation; the other is to bind U j (i.e. the share s j ) with all participant U m and thus make U j inseparable from the others. In this sense, we say that all participants in U m form a tightly coupled group, the secret can be recovered only if all participants collaborate. That is why we name our scheme Tightly Coupled Secret Sharing. Remark 3.3. A (t,m,n)-TCSS is an improved (t,n)-SS, it directly uses components, instead of shares, to recover the secret. On one hand, as a (t,n)-SS , it requires at least t shareholders to reconstruct the secret. On the other hand, once m (n ≥m≥ t) shareholders decide to recover the secret, they compose a tightly coupled group by each generating a component independently. In this case, the secret can be recovered only if all m participants have valid components, which in turn means each participant has the right share.
Proposed (t,m,n)-TCSS based on Linear Code
This section proposes a concrete linear code based (t,m,n)-TCSS scheme by following the above definition and framework.
Entities and Model
There are 3 types of entity in our proposed (t,m,n)-TCSS scheme, the Dealer, n shareholders and some adversaries. In order to facilitate group oriented applications or some other distributed applications, we use the same communication model as Harn's scheme [13] . That is, during secret reconstruction, each pair of participants share a private channel to exchange private information (i.e., components in our scheme) and thus recover the secret independently.
1) Dealer
The dealer is the honest coordinator trusted by all shareholders, and responsible for scheme setup such as determining system parameters, choosing the secret, generating and distributing shares and so on. We simply assume that the dealer allocates each share to the corresponding shareholder securely since our work merely focuses on security during secret reconstruction.
2) Shareholders
There are totally n shareholders, each with a share generated by the dealer. Every pair of them share a private channel to exchange information. Different from most security model, we assume that the channel may be cracked in extreme cases. Consequently, information through the channel may be intercepted by adversaries. When m, (m ≥ t) shareholders (i.e. participants) recover the secret, each of them first exchanges components with the others through corresponding private channels. Then, every participant independently recovers the secret from all components.
Note that once the secret is recovered, every participant has the secret. Therefore, we assume that a shareholder only constructs a single component in its lifetime and never generates more than one component with its share.
3) Adversaries
Our goal is to prevent an adversary, without any valid share, from access to the secret illegally.
In most cases, legal shareholders care more about secret disclosure than recovering the secret correctly, i.e. they would rather give up recovering the secret than leak it to adversaries. Therefore, in order to prevent secret disclosure, (t,m,n)-TCSS considers the following adversaries.
(1) Outsider: It is an adversary without any valid share. An Outsider appears in 2 forms during secret reconstruction. a) Outsider-1: It impersonates a legal shareholder but without the right share. That is, in the name of some legal shareholder, it is allowed to receive private information (i.e., components in our scheme) from the other participants and send a forged component to the others. An Outsider-1 aims to forge a valid component from received ones or obtain the secret.
b) Outsider-2: It somehow cracks private channels between some participants and thus can intercept any information ( i.e., components in our scheme) through these cracked channels by eavesdropping. It aims to figure out shares or even the secret from components available.
Note that, since a participant never generates more than one component with its share, an Outsider can only obtain a single component from one participant at most.
(2) Insider: It is actually a legal shareholder. When less than t shareholders conspire to recover the secret, these misbehaving shareholders are called Insiders. They aim to recover the secret with less than t shareholders participating.
Remark 4.1. In secret reconstruction of traditional (t, n)-SS, shares are exchanged privately among shareholders. In contrast, (t, m, n)-TCSS requires components, instead of shares, to be exchanged among shareholders during secret reconstruction. In (t, n)-SS, if an Outsider-2 cracks a private channel between 2 participants, it can easily obtain the shares through the cracked channel. Consequently, the Outsider-2 can take advantage of the intercepted share and act as an Insider in the future. Therefore, Outsider-2 and Insider are closely connected with each other in (t, n)-SS . However, the case is quite different in (t, m, n)-TCSS. We know from section 3 that a component has different properties from a share and a share cannot be obtained from a given component. Moreover, an component binds a shareholder with the other participants and make them inseparable. As a result, 1) an Outsider-2 is distinct from an Insider in (t, m, n)-TCSS, since the Outsider-2 cannot figure out any share even if it intercepts some components by eavesdropping. Therefore, if the Outsider-2 intercepts some components generated by a tightly coupled group of m, (m > t) shareholders, it has to further collect all the m components before obtaining the secret. In contrast, an Insider is allowed to flexibly choose any number of shareholders to form a tightly coupled group before secret reconstruction. Of course, as long as t insiders are available, the secret can be recovered. 2) An Outsider-1 is also different from Outsider-2 since Outsider-1 actively participates in secret reconstruction while Outsider-2 just passively eavesdrops components. The components collected by Outsider-1 contain information of its own while the components intercepted by Outsider-2 do not have any information of itself.
Our Scheme
The proposed (t,m,n)-TCSS consists of 1)Share Generation, 2) Component Construction and 3) Secret Reconstruction (see Figure 3) .
In Share Generation, the dealer picks parameters to initialize the scheme, generates n shares and allocates each one to a shareholder securely. If m, (m ≥ t) shareholders need to recover the secret, they form a tightly coupled group by each constructing a component with the share, a random number and all participants' identities (i.e. Component Construction). In Secret Reconstruction, all m participants exchange components through private channels, each participant recovers the secret independently by adding up all m components. Roughly speaking, since all components are required in recovering the secret, the scheme are capable of frustrating IP and HTCC attacks.
More detailed description are given as follows.
1) Share Generation
Suppose there are n shareholders U = {U i |U i ∈ F * p , i ∈ I n }, I n = {1, 2, ..., n} and a dealer D in the scheme, LC is a [n + 1, t] linear code of length (n + 1), dimension t. D chooses two large primes p,q with p > nq 2 and G t×(n+1) = ( g 0 , g 1 , ..., g n ), the public generator matrix of LC, g i is a column vector, i = 0, 1, ...n. G t×(n+1) has rank t, i.e., any t column vectors are linearly independent while any set of t + 1 column vectors are linearly dependent, which guarantees that any t or more than t shareholders are qualified to reconstruct the secret, but less than t shareholders are unqualified. The following Vandermonde matrix is an option of G t×(n+1) for distinct
. . .
The dealer first randomly chooses the secret s ∈ F q and determines a non-zero row vector v = (v 0 , ..., v t−1 ) ∈ F and then generates the code word w = (s, s 1 , ..., s n ) = vG t×(n+1) . Finally, the dealer allocates s i to U i as the share secretly for i = 0, 1, ...n.
2) Component Construction
If m, (m ≥ t) participants,
In this way, all participants share {b i |b i ∈ F * p , i ∈ I m } without interaction. Each participant, e.g. U i ∈ U m , picks a random number r i ∈ U F q in private and constructs a component as 
3) Secret Reconstruction
Each participant in U m , e.g. U i , releases the component c i to the others through corresponding private channels. After obtaining all components {c j |j ∈ I m }, U i recovers the secret as
Entities:
Dealer: D; n shareholders: U = {U i |U i ∈ F * p , i ∈ I n }, I n = {1, 2, ..., n}; U i is the public identity of each shareholder; m out of n shareholders:
Public primes: p, q with p > nq 2 ; Linear code: LC with length n + 1 and dimension t; Public generator matrix of LC:
.., g n ) with rank t, column vector g i ∈ F t p , i=0, 1, ..., n;
Private row vector: v = (v 0 , ..., v t−1 ) ∈ F t p ; Secret:s = v g 0 mod p, s ∈ F q ; Algorithms:
1) Share Generation D randomly picks s ∈ F q , designates v = (v 0 , ..., v t−1 ) ∈ F t p and G t×(n+1) , such that s = v g 0 mod p, allocates s i = v g i mod p to U i as the share privately and securely for i = 1, 2, ..., n, makes G t×(n+1) public and keeps v and s in secret.
2) Component Construction
To recover the secret, m shareholders, U m form a tightly coupled group. That is, according to some specified rule (see step 2) in section 4.2), each participant U i ∈ U m first determines the unique set of public coefficients {b i |b i ∈ F * p , i ∈ I m } by itself such that g 0 = i∈Im b i g i mod p. Then it picks a random number r i ∈ U F q privately to compute a component as c i = (b i s i + r i q) mod p.
3) Secret Reconstruction Each participant U i ∈ U m releases c i to the other participants through private channels. After collecting all components, each participant independently recovers the secret as s = ( j∈Im c j mod p) mod q. 
Correctness
Theorem 4.1. In (t,m,n)-TCSS, any t or more than t shareholders are able to reconstruct the secret from all their components. That is, given m (m ≥ t) shareholders U m = {U j |j ∈ I m }, each shareholder U j with the component c j = (b j s j + r j q) mod p, j ∈ I m , the secret can be recovered as
Proof.
( j∈Im c j mod p) mod q = ( j∈Im b j s j mod p + j∈Im r j q) mod p mod q = (s + j∈Im r j q) mod p mod q (4 − 2) = (s + j∈Im r j q) mod q (4 − 3) = s
Note that we have s+ j∈Im r j q ≤ s+m(q −1)q < nq 2 < p due to s ∈ F q , r j ∈ U F q and p > nq 2 . As a result, (4-2) is equivalent to (4-3).
Security analyses of (t,m,n)-TCSS Scheme
In (t,m,n)-TCSS, we use component to protect a participant's share. To reconstruct the secret, adversaries must get either at least t right shares or all m, (m ≥ t) valid components if m participants collaborate. We show the security by the following 4 theorems. Theorem 5.1 shows that one cannot figure out the share from a given component; Theorem 5.2 proves the capability of (t,m,n)-TCSS against IP attack while Theorem 5.3 guarantees the scheme is resistant to HTCC attack; Theorem 5.4 testifies to the fact that up to t − 1 Insiders are still unable to reconstruct the secret in (t,m,n)-TCSS.
Theorem 5.1. In (t,m,n)-TCSS, given c i = (b i s i + r i q) mod p, the component of participant U i (i ∈ I m ), the probability for an adversary to derive the share s i is 1/q, i.e. P (s i |c i ) = 1/q, where are p, q large primes with p > nq 2 , r i is uniformly distributed in F q , s i and b i are over F p and F * p respectively. Proof: From c i = (b i s i + r i q) mod p, we have i , p and q are known, given c i , the share s i is a function of r i from the adversary's view. According to the property of finite field F p , there must be different values of s i for distinct r i . Consequently, there are totally q distinct values of s i when r i varies over F q . As a result, an adversary derives s i from c i with the probability 1/q for r i ∈ U F q .
Theorem 5.1 implies that, given the component c i , an adversary never has a chance more than 1/q to get the covered share s i , which is as difficult as directly guessing the secret when it is uniformly selected from the secret space F q . The theorem shows a share can be well protected by the component.
In the following, we give Lemma 5.1, Lemma 5.2 and Corollary 5.1 as the basis to prove that a component has a uniform distribution over F q , which in turn lays the groundwork for Theorem 5.2 and 5.3.
Lemma 5.1. Suppose that random variable x is uniformly distributed in F p , for any value t ∈ F * p , xt has a uniform distribution over F p . Proof: we immediately get the lemma from the property of finite field F p .
Lemma 5.2. Given prime p and random variables x i , i = 1, 2, .., k, mutually independent and uniformly distributed in F p , k i=1 t i x i mod p has a uniform distribution over F p if not all values t i ∈ F p , i = 1, 2, ..., k , are zero. Proof: Let us first consider the case of k = 2 then generalize the case of k being any positive integer.
1) If one of t 1 and t 2 is zero, it is obvious that (t 1 x 1 + t 2 x 2 ) mod p is uniformly distributed over F p from Lemma 5.1.
If both t 1 and t 2 are nonzero, t 1 x 1 and t 2 x 2 are uniformly distributed over F p from lemma 5.1. To prove (t 1 x 1 + t 2 x 2 ) mod p is uniformly distributed in F p , we assume that x 11 and x 12 are any 2 different values of variable x 1 . In this case, t 1 x 11 and t 1 x 12 are obviously distinct in F p for gcd(t 1 , p) = 1. Thus, (t 1 x 11 + t 2 x 2 ) mod p and (t 1 x 12 + t 2 x 2 ) mod p are 2 distinct permutations of {0, 1, 2, ..., p − 1} when x 2 varies over F p . More generally, (t 1 x 1i + t 2 x 2 ) mod p are distinct permutations of {0, 1, 2, ..., p − 1} for different x 1i , (i = 0, 1, 2, ..., p − 1), values of random variable x 1 . That is, each value in {0, 1, 2, ..., p − 1} appears with the same frequency. Therefore,
2) Now that (t 1 x 1 +t 2 x 2 ) mod p is uniformly distributed in F p , by iterating the procedure in 1), we have that
b j y j ) mod p has a uniform distribution over F p if random variables x i and y i are uniformly distributed over F p and F q respectively for i = 1, 2, .., k and j = 1, 2, .., l, where all variables are mutually independent, p and q are positive primes with q ≤ p, values a i , b j ∈ F * p , j, k ∈ Z. Proof: (omitted) the corollary can be proved by the method similar to lemma 5.2. In the following, we first show that, for an Outsider-1, c m , the component of U m , is indistinguishable from a random variable uniformly distributed in F p . Then, we prove that the Outsider-1 forging a valid component is nearly as difficult as directly guessing the secret within the secret space. Finally, we show that the Outsider-1 cannot get the secret by forging multiple components.
1) First, we show that, in the view of Outsider-1, each unknown share and the corresponding component are uniformly distributed over F p .
We have
, where each v i is an integer uniformly and privately selected by the dealer within F p . From the view of Outsider-1, each v i is indistinguishable from a random variable uniformly distributed over F p ; g i is a nonzero column vector for U i ∈ F * p , 1 ≤ i ≤ n. According to Lemma 5.2, each unknown share, s i = v g i mod p, is uniformly distributed over F p for an Outsider.
Obviously, the corresponding component c i = (b i s i + r i q) mod p, (c i ∈ C m ) and m i=1 c i mod p are also uniformly distributed over F p according to Corollary 5.1. Note that, for the Outsider-1, s i and r i are uniformly distributed over F p and F q respectively while b i and q are fixed values.
2) In this case, the Outsider-1 is allowed to forge any value of c m , say c m . Assume F(.) is some function which takes C m = {c 1 , c 2 , ..., c m−1 , c m } or any subset of C m as input and produces a presumed secret, e.g., s = F(C m ) as output. In practice, F(.) denotes any method taken by the Outsider-1 to derive a presumed secret s from available information, i.e., C m or its any subset. Without losing the generality, suppose that the Outsider-1 derives a value s = F(C m ) in some way, if s happens to equal the secret s, the Outsider-1 succeeds. Now let examine the probability of success, P (s = s).
Note that the left-hand side of (5-1) is uniformly distributed of F p . Consequently, there are at most p/q + 1 possible values of λ satisfying the equation (5-1), and thus P (s = s), the probability for an Outsider-1 to impersonate a legal shareholder, is not larger than ( p/q + 1)/p. Due to lim q→+∞ ( p/q + 1)/p = 1/q, the Outsider-1 successfully forging a component is nearly as difficult as directly guessing the secret within F q .
3)
Step 2) shows that every time the Outsider-1 forges a component c m , it only has the probability of nearly 1/q to obtain the secret. Moreover, forging one component does not increase the probability of success for forging another component since the unknown component c m is uniformly distributed over F p for the Outsider-1. Consequently, the Outsider-1 theoretically has a probability more than 1/2 to obtain the secret only when it forges more than q/2 different components. However, q is a larger integer, forging q/2 different components is infeasible.
Therefore, the proposed (t,m,n)-TCSS scheme is able to thwart IP attack from an Outsider-1.
Theorem 5.3. Our (t,m,n)-TCSS scheme is able to prevent HTCC attack. Concretely, if C m is the component set of a tightly coupled group with m (m ≥ t) legal participants, an Outsider-2, having cracked less than m/2 private channels, obtain nearly no information about the secret, i.e. C m = {c 1 , c 2 , . .., c m } accordingly. If an Outsiders-2 cracks less than m/2 private channels, it intercepts at most m − 1 components, e.g., C J = {c 1 , c 2 , ..., c i , . .., c j } with c i = (b i s i + r i q) mod p, r i ∈ U F q , j < m.
To prove the theorem, we first identify the upper bound of P (s|C J ), the probability of the secret s with C J . Then we complete the proof lim q→+∞ I(s; C J ) = 0. Finally, we show that mounting multiple HTCC attacks is impractical.
In the proof of Theorem 5.2, we already showed that, for an adversary, e.g., Outsider-2, each unknown share and the corresponding component are uniformly distributed over F p .
1) Now let examine the probability for the Outsider-2 to recover the secret s from C J , i.e., P (s|C J ).
Outsider-2 derives a presumed secret s = F(C J ), where F(.) is a function similar to that in the proof of Theorem 5.2, which takes C J or its subset as input and produces a presumed value s as output. Successfully recovering the secret from
Note that the left side of (5-2) is uniformly distributed over F p according to Lemma 5.2. Consequently, there are at most p/q + 1 valid values of λ satisfying (5-2).
As a result, P (s|C J ) is no larger than ( p/q + 1)/p. 2) Note that the secret s is uniformly selected from F q in the view of Outsider-2, i.e., the probability P (s) = 1/q. As a result, for any small value ε, the mutual information of s with C J is I(s;
< ε. Thus, lim p/q→+∞ I(s; C J ) = 0, i.e., lim q→+∞ I(s; C J ) = 0 due to p/q > nq.
3) Similar to the case in Theorem 5.2, the Outsider-2 may obtains different C J or subsets of C J by cracking different group of private channels, and derives a distinct value of s . Every time it derives a value of s , the probability of success is always the same for |C J | < m − 1. Therefore, it is impractical for the Outsider-2 to figure out the secret by mounting multiple HTCC attacks.
Remark 5.1. Theorem 5.3 implies that an adversary, even with m − 1 components, is still unable to obtain the secret. To figure out the secret, an Outsider-2 has to crack at least m/2 private channels to intercept all m components C m = {c 1 , c 2 , . .., c m }. Therefore, (t,m,n)-TCSS can thwart HTCC attack and is more robust than traditional (t,n)-SSs in defeating private channel cracking attack.
Insiders, who have valid shares, may conspire and try to reconstruct the secret directly with their shares. The following theorem ensures that the proposed scheme is still secure even if t − 1 Insiders conspire.
Theorem 5.4. In the proposed (t,m,n)-TCSS, less than t Insiders cannot obtain the secret. That is, less than t Insiders obtain nearly no information about the secret s, i.e. lim q→+∞ I(s; S ) = 0, where S denotes a set of less than t shares available for Insiders. Proof: For simplicity, assume that
Insiders with the corresponding shares S t−1 = {s 1 , s 2 , ..., s t−1 } , s t = v g t mod p is the unknown share for U t−1 and the secret is s = t i=1 b i s i mod p mod q, where b i ∈ F p , i = 1, 2, ..., t, can be publicly determined from the generator matrix.
Obviously, from the view of U t−1 , t i=1 b i s i mod p is indistinguishable from a random variable uniformly distributed over F p . The same as in Theorem 5.2 and 5.3, we assume F(.) is any function which takes S t−1 or its subset as input and produces a presumed secret s as output. Suppose that U t−1 derives a presumed secret s = F(S t−1 ) from S t−1 .
Similarly, let examine the probability P (s|S t−1 ), i.e., P (s = s).
, the left side of (5-4) is uniformly distributed over F p for U t−1 since the unknown s t has a uniform distribution over F p . Similarly, for any less than t Insiders with the corresponding share set S , the property of uniform distribution over F p still holds.
Consequently, similar to the case in Theorem 5.3, there are at most p/q + 1 values of λ satisfying (5-4) in F p , i.e., less than t Insiders obtain the secret with the largest probability ( p/q + 1)/p, namely, P (s|S ) = ( p/q + 1)/p. As a result,
and thus lim q→+∞ I(s; S ) = 0. 
Comparisons of (t,m,n)-TCSS
The proposed scheme improves the security of traditional (t,n)-SS based on components. As far as we know, Harn's SSR scheme [13] is the most similar to (t,m,n)-TCSS. So we compare our scheme with Harn's SSR and some other traditional (t,n)-SSs. Moreover, since Shuffling schemes and threshold changeable SSs have potential in preventing IP and HTCC attacks simultaneously, we also make comparisons between them and (t,m,n)-TCSS.
Tightly coupled SS
In traditional (t,n)-SSs, a participant can reconstruct the secret as long as it obtains t or more than t shares. Consequently, a participant, even without a valid share, may obtain the secret after collecting t shares from enough participants. For the same reason, in (t, n)-threshold changeable SS schemes, if the threshold is changed to t > t and there are more than t participants in secret reconstruction, an illegal participant is still able to obtain the secret. Similarly, in Harn's (t, n)-SSR, if there are over (t + k − 1) participants recovering the secret (k is the number of polynomials), an illegal participant, without a valid share, may obtain the secret or forge a valid Lagrange component successfully without being detected [4] . Therefore, the above 3 types of SSs are vulnerable to IP attack in general cases. The reason is that all participants in these schemes are not tightly coupled; i.e., not all participants are required to actually contribute to secret reconstruction; in other words, even if some participant does not release a valid share or Lagrange component, the secret is still can be recovered by some participant.
However, if m, (t ≤ m ≤ n) participants want to recover the secret in our scheme, they actually first form a tightly coupled group by constructing a component each. As a result, the secret can be recovered only if all m participants in the group have valid shares and actually contribute to secret reconstruction. Therefore, our scheme is tightly coupled.
Security
The security of our scheme does not depend on any computational assumption, i.e., our scheme is independent of one way function or conventional hard problems, such as Discrete Logarithm Problem, Factorization and so on.
Traditional (t,n)-SSs, such as Shamir's SS [1] , Asmuth-Bloom's SS [23] , Mignotte's SS [21] and linear code based (t,n)-SSs [26] are vulnerable to both HTCC and IP attacks. As mentioned above, Harn's SSR [13] is actually vulnerable to IP attack when the number of participants is large enough to make all participants' Lagrange Components linearly dependent [4] (see Table  1 ). Most (t,n)-Threshold changeable SS schemes are also vulnerable to IP attack in the case that the number of participants is larger than the changed threshold t . In comparison, our (t,m,n)-TCSS is capable of preventing both HTCC and IP attacks without such limitations.
Obviously, Threshold changeable SSs can prevent IP and HTCC attacks only when the current threshold t is equal to m, the number of participants. Therefore, we set their changed threshold in Table 2 to be m to guarantee the capability of preventing both attacks. Table 2 shows that, in preventing HTCC attack, related threshold changeable SSs [5] [9] [10] [6] , complete shuffling scheme [15] and our scheme can force an Outsider-2 to crack at least m/2 private channels before obtaining the secret. But for the partial shuffling scheme [14] , the lower bound of cracked private channels is only t, which is irrelevant to m, the number of participants, and thus is not so desirable as our scheme.
Efficiency
Each shareholder in Harn's SSR has k ≥ 2 shares, some threshold changeable SSs [11] [5] [12] also require each shareholder to hold multiple shares. In contrast, each shareholder in (t,m,n)-TCSS only holds a single share.
Both tables list the approximate number of messages and operations. In communication, m participants in complete shuffling scheme [15] need to send m(m − 1), (approximate to m 2 ) extra messages before exchanging shares in secret reconstruction. Similarly, m participants in partial shuffling scheme [14] need to exchange m extra messages. In comparison, our proposed scheme needs no additional message exchange before participants release their components. Therefore, our scheme is as efficient as traditional (t,n)-SSs in communication.
In computation, each participant needs to generate a component and then recover the secret from all components. To construct a component, each participant, e.g., U i just needs to pick a random integer r i independently and evaluates the component c i = (b i s i + r i q) mod p without interaction. To recover the secret, a participant just needs to add all components up simply. In total, our scheme needs about 2m additive and 2m multiplicative operations modulo p per participant during secret reconstruction, which is the most efficient scheme. (see Table 1 and Table 2 ).
Information Rate
Information rate is the size ratio of secret to share, which denotes the efficiency of a shareholder sharing a secret. In Shamir's (t,n)-SS and the linear code based (t,n)-SS, the information rate is 1 because the secret and shares are from the same range. But the information rate of Asmuth-Bloom's scheme is less than 1 because each share has a bigger value domain than the secret. The information rate of our proposed scheme is log q/ log p, which can be confined between 1/2 and 1/3 by picking p and q with q 3 > p > nq 2 for q is much larger than n. The information rate of our scheme is lower than that of Shamir's SS, which is just the cost our scheme pays for the above extra security.
However, the information rate of Harn's SSR scheme [13] is 1/k, because each participant holds k shares and each share has the same range as the secret. Harn's SSR scheme has a lower information rate than our scheme for k > 3. Although the information rate of Harn's SSR scheme is 1/2 for k = 2, which is higher than ours, the restricted condition kt >n−1, i.e., 2t >n−1 requires at least one half of all n shareholders to participate in secret reconstruction; thus, it is impractical in the case with a large number of shareholders. For Harn's dynamic threshold SS [5] , the information rate is 1/t since each shareholder uses a polynomial of degree t − 1 over GF (p) as its share and the secret is a value over GF (p).
Summary
To sum up, in security, the proposed (t,m,n)-TCSS is tightly coupled and capable of preventing IP and HTCC attacks without special limitations. Therefore, it is more secure when compared with related schemes. In storage, each participant in our scheme just needs to keep a single share, and thus our scheme is efficient in storage and has a relatively high information rate. In communication, our scheme is the same as Shamir's (t, n)-SS, both are the most efficient. In computation, our scheme is also the most efficient especially in secret reconstruction. Harn's SS [13] (k polynomials) 
Application to Group Authentication
To facilitate authentication in group oriented applications such as group chat in Wechat, Harn proposed the notion of Group Authentication [20] , which allows each group user to check whether all users belong to the same group at once.
Concretely, (t, m, n)-Group Authentication can be formulated as follows. The group manager GM computes tokens, s i , i = 1, 2, ..., n from a selected secret s, allocates each token, i.e., s i to group member U i ∈ U securely and makes H(s) publicly known, where H(.) is a one-way hash function. In (t, m, n)-Group Authentication, there are m users, P i , i = 1, 2, ..., m, each user P i computes a component c i from its token and releases c i to the others. (t, m, n)-Group Authentication allows each user to verify whether all released values are valid at once. That is,
where GA is the group authentication algorithm and F is a public function.
Harn also presented an asynchronous (t, m, n)-group authentication scheme [20] based on the aforementioned SSR [13] . Due to the disadvantages of SSR, Harn's (t,m,n)-group authentication is inflexible due to the restriction kt > n − 1 and is vulnerable to IP attack. Based on the notion of (t,m,n) group authentication, Parikshit N. Mahalle, et.al. [2] developed a group authentication scheme, called TCGA, for the Internet of Things, which uses Paillier Threshold Cryptography as the underlying secret sharing scheme. Paillier Threshold Cryptography is a public key variant of the (t,n)-SS. However, it is doubtful whether or not the TCGA scheme is appropriate for Internet of Things (IoT) because most nodes in IoT are low in computing power.
In the following, we will propose a group authentication scheme based on the above (t, m, n)−TCSS, which allows each group user to independently check whether all users belong to the same group at once.
Group authentication scheme based on (t,m,n)-TCSS
Obviously, (t, m, n)−TCSS is tightly couple. That is, to recover the secret, each of m participants has to necessarily hold a valid share. In this case, if each group member is allocated a share as the token in advance and all users ( group members or non-members) collectively run the secret reconstruction in (t, m, n)−TCSS, the secret can be recovered only if all users have a valid token each. That is, recovering the secret successfully means all users are legal group members. In this way, any user is able to authenticate that whether all users are legal members at a time, instead of one by one.
Entities:
The Group Manager: GM; Complete set of n group members:U = {U i |U i ∈ F * p , i ∈ I n },I n = {1, 2, ..., n}; U i is the public identity of each group member.
Parameters:
Private row vector: v = (v 0 , ..., v t−1 ) ∈ F t p ; Secret:s = v g 0 mod p, s ∈ F q ; One way hash function: H(.); Algorithms:
1) Token Generation GM designates v, s and G t×(n+1) , allocates s i = v g i to U i , i = 1, 2, ...n, as the token securely, makes H(s), G t×(n+1) public while keeps v and s secret.
2) Group Authentication (1) To authenticate any m users P m = {P i |i ∈ I m ⊆ I n , |I m | = m ≥ t} at once, each user P i ∈ P m determines the public coefficients {b i |b i ∈ F * p , i ∈ I m } independently such that g 0 = i∈Im b i g i mod p, and then picks random number r i ∈ U F q privately to compute a component as c i = (b i s i + r i q) mod p.
(2) Each user P i ∈ P m releases the component c i to the other users through private channels. After collecting all components, each user computes s as s = ( j∈Im c j mod p) mod q. If H(s ) = H(s), all users in P m have been authenticated successfully, i.e., all users in P m belong to U; otherwise there is at least one non-member of U. Remark 7.1. Based on (t,m,n)-TCSS, the group authentication scheme can be easily converted into an authenticated group key agreement scheme by modifying step (2) in 2) as follows.
(2') Each user P i ∈ P m releases the component to the other users through private channels. On collecting all components, each user computes s = ( j∈Im c j mod p) mod q. If H(s ) = H(s), all users in P m belong to U and the group key is k = j∈Im c j mod p. Otherwise, there exists at least one non-member of U and the group key agreement is aborted.
Correctness and security
In the proposed group authentication, a user can recover the secret and thus authenticate all users at once if each user is a group member and releases a valid component. Otherwise, if a user (i.e. non-member) does not have a valid token, it cannot construct a valid component. Consequently, the secret cannot be recovered correctly and the non-member fails to pass the group authentication.
Theorem 7.1. In the proposed Group Authentication scheme, a nonmember, even with m − 1 valid components of a group, fails to forge a new valid component of the group to pass the authentication. Proof: If a non-member, with m − 1 valid components, could forge a valid component, it must be capable of recovering the secret. However, it follows from theorem 5.2 and 5.3 that a non-member is unable to obtain the secret with m − 1 valid components. Therefore, the non-member fails to forge a valid component. Theorem 7.2. In the proposed Group Authentication scheme, t − 1 group members fails to forge a valid token for a non-member to pass the authentication in the same group. Proof: The theorem can be immediately obtained from theorem 5.4.
Properties and Comparisons
(1) Efficiency Obviously, the communication overhead is limited because each user merely needs to release a component to the others. This can be efficiently accomplished by broadcasting the component if all users share a private broadcasting channel.
In authentication, each user only needs to compute a component from the token locally and releases it to the other users, and then adds its own component and m − 1 received ones up to authenticate all users. As we know, in secret reconstruction with m participants of traditional (t,n)-SSs, each participant usually receives m − 1 shares from the other participants and needs O(m 2 ) additive/multiplicative operations to recover the secret independently. In comparison, although our group authentication scheme is based on (t, m, n)-TCSS, which further comes from traditional (t, n)-SS, it requires only about O(m) additive/multiplicative operations for each user. Besides, the proposed group authentication scheme does not depend on any public key system and thus is more efficient in computation if compared with TCGA [2] .
Moreover, distinct from conventional authentication schemes which authenticate a single user each time, our group authentication scheme authenticates all users at once.
(2) Flexibility
As a matter of fact, group authentication scheme can be constructed simply based on traditional (t, n)-SS if all users (i.e., participants in (t, n)-SS) release their tokens (i.e., shares) at the same time. In this case, a nonmember will be detected since it release a wrong token. In contrast, the proposed group authentication works for m (t ≤m≤ n) users and does not require all users to release components simultaneously.
Moreover, the authentication scheme allows each user to hold only one token and does not have limitation, such as kt > n − 1 in Harn's group authentication scheme or t = m in threshold changeable SS based group authentication schemes. Therefore, the proposed group authentication scheme is more flexible compared with related schemes. Remark 7.2. Of course, the proposed group authentication scheme can only verify whether all users are group members, but cannot identify a nonmember if it exists. However, the scheme can be used to pre-authenticate all users efficiently and conventional authentication schemes can be applied if there is a non-member. [26] , which endows a (t, n)-SS with new security features. The paper constructs the (t,m,n)-TCSS from a linear code based (t,n)-SS [26] . Similarly, we can also design (t,m,n)-TCSSs from Shamir's (t,n)-SS [1] or Blakey's (t,n)-SS [22] in the same way, because they are all the same in nature. Even for CRT based (t,n)-SSs [23] [21] , distinct from the above 3 traditional (t,n)-SSs in type, we can still construct the corresponding (t,m,n)-TCSSs by adjusting the secret space and adding a proper random noise in component construction.
Dynamic threshold secret sharing
In essence, (t, m, n)-TCSS dynamically changes the threshold from t to m when m participants recover the secret. That is, our (t, m, n)-TCSS presents a simple way to change threshold into m during secret reconstruction. Moreover, the constructed scheme is asymtotically perfect, unconditionally secure and dealer-free after share generation. Compared with related threshold changeable SSs, the scheme is more efficient in storage, computation and communication.
Conclusion
Nowadays, group oriented applications are getting more and more popular and require more secure and efficient (t,n)-SS to satisfy their security requirements. The paper first identifies IP and HTCC attacks against (t,n)-SS and then presents the notion and generic framework of (t,m,n)-TCSS to cope with them. Most traditional (t,n)-SSs can be conveniently converted into (t,m,n)-TCSSs by following the framework and thus be endowed with the new capability of thwarting IP and HTCC attacks. Moreover, the framework can also be used to construct threshold changeable SSs easily from traditional (t, n)-SS. As a matter of fact, (t,m,n)-TCSS scheme by the framework can be applied to any scenario of traditional (t,n)-SS.
As an implementation of the framework, a concrete (t,m,n)-TCSS scheme is constructed from the linear code based (t,n)-SS. The (t,m,n)-TCSS scheme is capable of preventing IP, HTCC as well as (t − 1) Insiders conspiring attacks. Moreover, the (t,m,n)-TCSS is independent of hard problems or one way function. Compared with Harn's SSR scheme, it is also more secure, more efficient in computation and higher in information rate for k > 2. In contrast with threshold changeable SSs and Shuffling schemes, it is more efficient in storage, communication and computation.
To complete rapid m-to-m authentication in group oriented applications, a group authentication scheme is proposed from (t,m,n)-TCSS. It allows each user in a group to check whether all users are legal group members at once. Compared with related schemes, the proposed authentication scheme is more flexible and efficient.
